27178-2 **Vancouver Registry**

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia (BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE HOLMES AND JURY)

Vancouver, B.C. June 20, 2017

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٧.

PATRICK HENRY FOX

PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

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BAN ON PUBLICATION - INHERENT JURISDICTION

Crown Counsel: M. Myhre

Appearing on his own behalf by videoconference:

P. Fox

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1
                                Vancouver, B.C.
2
                                June 20, 2017
3
4
              (JURY OUT)
5
6
              (VIDEOCONFERENCE COMMENCES)
7
              (THE ACCUSED IN REMOTE LOCATION)
8
9
    THE CLERK: The Supreme Court of British Columbia, at
10
         Vancouver, this 20th day of June, 2017, recalling
11
         the matter of Her Majesty the Queen against
12
         Patrick Henry Fox, My Lady.
13
    THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Fox can you hear me?
14
    THE ACCUSED: Yes, I can; thank you.
15
    THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sheriff, I don't think we
16
         need you unless you wish to be here, but --
17
    THE SHERIFF: I'll [indiscernible/not at microphone].
    THE COURT: -- it's up to you.
18
19
    THE COURT: Thank you.
20
    THE COURT: All right.
21
   MR. MYHRE: My Lady, I believe the main purpose of
22
        being here right now is to address the issue of
23
         whether transport contemplates transportation by
24
         third parties or whether it's just by the
25
         individual licence holder.
26
    THE COURT: Yes.
27
    MR. MYHRE: And so I have submissions prepared on that.
28
         Mr. Fox, did you receive my materials a few hours
29
30
    THE ACCUSED: I did. Not a few hours ago, but I did
31
         receive them. I've had a chance to skim through
32
         them.
33
    SUBMISSIONS RE FIREARMS FOR CROWN BY MR. MYHRE:
34
35
36
    MR. MYHRE: So My Lady, I sent Mr. Fox everything I'll
37
         -- I'll be referring Your Honour to and I told him
38
         which paragraphs of the cases I would specifically
39
         be referring to or relying on.
40
              So my submission is essentially this: That
41
         when you consider the purpose and the scheme of
42
         the Firearms Act, it's quite clear that transport
43
         refers to transport in the personal possession of
44
         the licence holder.
45
              So this begins with the basic principles of
46
        statutory interpretation. The words of an Act are
47
         to be read in their entire context, in their
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Submissions re Firearms for Crown by Mr. Myhre

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grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

I did look up the Oxford Dictionary definition of transport. It doesn't really assist, but it simply says, "take or carry from one place to another". The purpose of the Firearms Act was considered in -- of course, the reference Re: Firearms Act, first case I've handed up. And I've highlighted the two portions that I say are particularly relevant here on paragraphs -- page eight, paragraph 20.

So broadly the purpose the government had was to promote public safety. And over the page at paragraph 21, the court considers a number of the problems the Act was meant to address. And the first one they list, they list several. One is the illegal trade in guns both within Canada and across the border with the United States.

I've handed up the case Cancade because it deals, generally, with the interpretations of terms within the Firearms Act -- or sorry, related to firearms charges. And so this -- Cancade was a case in which somebody had been mailed some parts that were, as they stood, illegal; but could be modified, and they were intended to be modified by the recipient to become legal. And the court -- that particular definition doesn't have application here, but the general principles they apply to the interpretation do.

So paragraph 18, the court sets out the appellant and respondent positions and I've highlighted the respondent's position because that's what is adopted by the court later on. The appropriate -- the respondent says:

...the appropriate methodology in construing this legislation is to take a purposive approach, having regard to the circumstance that this firearms legislation is to be broadly construed because of the obvious intent of Parliament to keep dangerous high capacity weapons out of public circulation.

And so because of that, they didn't take a really -- the most restrictive view possible of the term that was being considered. And that I've

1 highlighted one of relevant paragraphs from the 2 Supreme Court of Canada judgment relied on, and 3 then over at paragraph 22 where the court adopts 4 that line of reasoning. 5 So if I could take Your Ladyship to the 6 provisions of the Act --7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. MYHRE: -- that I say show that what's meant is 9 individual personal possession, and I've just 10 provided the table of contents because it's 11 certainly not my intention to cherry pick provisions here, but, of course, I did only print 12 13 out the provisions I thought had some bearing on 14 our inquiry. 15 But if I could take you to the first actual 16 bit of legislation on the fourth page; the s. 4 of 17 the purpose of the Act. So under s. (ii), the 18 purpose of the Act is to provide licences and 19 authorizations under which persons may possess 20 restricted weapons, et cetera, et cetera, in 21 circumstances that would otherwise constitution an 22 offence under ss. 93. 23 THE COURT: So in 4(a) --24 MR. MYHRE: Two. 25 THE COURT: -- Roman Numeral ii; little Roman numeral 26 ii. 27 MR. MYHRE: Yeah; it deals with the exact circumstance 28 we're talking about here. And what you'll see 29 later on in the Act is the default position is the 30 holder of a licence is allowed to have it in their 31 home, and anything beyond that has to be 32 explicitly provided for. 33 THE COURT: All right. 34 MR. MYHRE: Over the page, s. 5; what's contemplated 35 is -- and this is so simple I -- but anyway. 36 a person who holds a licence. THE COURT: Well, in the Federal statutory scheme, a 37 38 person doesn't mean "individual". Person includes 39 a corporation. It -- are make -- trying to make the submission that that means an individual? 40 41 MR. MYHRE: It certainly seemed to me that that made 42 sense. 43 THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that's -- I'd need to 44 hear more from you because the entire Criminal 45 Code is premised on the understanding of a person 46 as including an individual, a corporation, an 47 unincorporated association; think of the United

Submissions re Firearms for Crown by Mr. Myhre

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1 Nurses Association case. 2 MR. MYHRE: So, My Lady, what -- the other things 3 you'll see in the Firearms Act is they contemplate 4 specific criteria for when a person can hold a 5 licence. 6 THE COURT: Well -- and look, s. 19, for example, that's talking about an individual. So there --7 8 even within the extracts you've given me from the 9 Act, there appears to be two different usages; one 10 of a person, one of individual. And presumably, 11 there is a reason for the difference. MR. MYHRE: Well, if you look -- if you keep going in 12 sub -- in s. 5(2), in determining whether a person 13 14 is eligible, et cetera, et cetera; the firearms 15 -- Chief Firearms Officer should have regard to 16 whether a person has been treated for a mental 17 illness; has a history of behaviour that includes 18 violence. 19 THE COURT: That doesn't mean that no -- no entity can 20 be person unless they're capable of -- well, 21 anyway, I think if your submission rests on the 22 fact that "person" is used in s. 5, then you've 23 got a problem. 24 MR. MYHRE: It -- well, it's considering all the -- all 25 the sections that I've handed up to Your Ladyship. 26 So we could move on to the next ones. 27 Section 13, again, contemplates a person 28 holding a registration certificate. 29 And then s. 17 is the default position that I 30 mentioned. 31 So subject to ss. 19 and 20, a restrictive 32 firearms, the holder of the registration for which 33 is an individual may be --Sorry, just back to s. 13. Is that engaged 34 THE COURT: 35 here? Is it the Crown's position that Mr. Fox had 36 such a licence authorizing him to possess that 37 type of firearm? 38 MR. MYHRE: He did; yes. 39 THE COURT: All right. And then we go to...? Section 17. So the default position; a 40 MR. MYHRE: 41 restricted firearm "may be possessed only at the 42 dwelling house of the individual". 43 THE COURT: Well, that's interesting actually. That is 44 starting to narrow the analysis to an individual. So it's -- appears to be saying that, whereas in 45 46 the previous section, it's a person that the 47 statute is speaking about, now in s. 17, we're

looking at a sit -- a subset in which the holder is an individual. That's how I read that. Is that how you read that, Mr. Myhre?

- MR. MYHRE: Well, I think Your Ladyship has just picked up on something that I didn't pick up on, which is the difference in using the terms individual and person. So it -- I mean, I didn't realize that, but it makes sense to me.
- THE COURT: So in s. 17 where the holder of the registration certificate is an individual, the firearm may possess -- be possessed only at the dwelling house of the individual, or a place authorized by a Chief Firearms Officer. Is that how you're reading that?
- MR. MYHRE: Yes. So I include s. 19 because it's referred to in s. 17; but if I could take Your Ladyship to s. 19(2.1). So:

... an individual who holds a licence authorizing the individual to possess ... restricted firearms must, if the licence is renewed, be authorized to transport them within the individual's province of residence...

To the five listed locations. And then at s. (e), we see the one that's potentially in contention here.

And My Lady, when you're thinking about the purpose of this Act and how to interpret these provisions, in my submission, the restrictions set out in s. (e) has a pretty clear intention. It specifies port of exit so that the person who is carrying — the individual who is carrying the firearm with them will go through customs, will declare their firearm, and will give the border personnel the opportunity to decide whether they are appropriately allowed into their country, and that's particularly germane here because that's exactly what —

- THE COURT: Well, how do we know that's the purpose? Maybe the purpose is just to recognize the jurisdictional limitations of the Act, that it extends only to the border.
- MR. MYHRE: Well, if one of the purposes of the Act is to combat smuggling, then of course, we need to know when firearms are going back and forth across

Submissions re Firearms for Crown by Mr. Myhre

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1
         the border. And that can't be done unless the
         person actually uses a port of exit.
3
    THE COURT: I see.
    MR. MYHRE: So the holder of an ATT couldn't jump in a
4
5
         boat and go across the border between the Gulf
6
         Islands. They have to use a port of exit.
    THE ACCUSED: I'm sorry to interrupt, but is the term
7
8
         "border exit" clearly defined anywhere?
9
    THE COURT: Does -- I don't know that; do you know
         that, Mr. Myhre?
10
11
    MR. MYHRE: I can't say --
12
    THE COURT: Right.
13
    MR. MYHRE: -- My Lady. I don't think so, but I didn't
14
         check specifically in the definitions for that.
15
    THE ACCUSED: I bring that up only because if it's not
16
         defined, then couldn't a port of exit be
17
         interpreted as meaning any point at which the
18
         person exits the country?
19
    THE COURT: Right, Mr. --
20
    THE ACCUSED: Or does it have to be -- sorry.
21
    THE COURT: Mr. Fox, I'm going to invite you to just
22
         make notes of what you want to --
23
    THE ACCUSED:
                 Sure.
24
    THE COURT: -- ask or say and, essentially, I'm going
25
         to hear from Mr. Myhre about his submissions.
26
    THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
27
    THE COURT: I may ask him questions, but I'm going to
28
         ask you to keep yours for now. And then when Mr.
         Myhre's finished, I'll -- I'll ask you to make
29
30
         your submissions, raise the questions you wish to
31
         raise.
32
    MR. MYHRE: So My Lady, I've included two more sections
33
         that I'd like to refer you to. If you could flip
34
         over a couple of pages to s. 23 that deals with
35
         the transfer, and in a similar vein, right below
36
         it, s. 33 which deals with lending. And Mr. Fox
37
         actually referred to the lending provision
38
         yesterday when he pointed out that you can have
39
         another person carry your firearms or lend them to
40
         another person as long as they have a licence.
41
    THE COURT: Go on.
42
    MR. MYHRE: And so in my submission, what this Act
43
         clearly contemplates is a very tight regulation of
44
         restricted firearms. And it certainly, and very
45
         obviously, doesn't contemplate transport by an
46
         unknowing third party.
47
    THE COURT: Do you have -- did you look at a French
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1
         version of the Act?
2
    MR. MYHRE:
               I did not, My Lady.
3
                That might be useful. Sometimes the French
    THE COURT:
4
         version will speak about something in a way that
5
         casts light on Parliament's intent. And I'm
6
         looking at s. 19(2.2) that seems to deal with
7
         transporting and transferring; both. Does that
8
         cast any light on the intended meaning of
9
         "transport"?
10
               I'm not sure -- I'm not sure that it does,
    MR. MYHRE:
11
         My Lady.
12
    THE COURT: All right.
13
    MR. MYHRE: My last submission relates to the
14
         Regulations. And in my submission, they support
15
         the interpretation urged by the Crown in two ways.
16
              First of all, as you can see in s. 11 of the
17
         Regulations in sub (d), it contemplates a
18
         situation in which the vehicle containing the
19
         firearm that's being transported may end up being
20
         unattended, and so the individual transporting
21
         this restricted firearm, if they're going to leave
22
         their vehicle unattended, would have to be sure to
23
         comply with s-s. (d), and they would not be able
24
         to do that if they didn't know they were carrying
25
         the firearm. And so you -- it's conceivable that
26
         the person who wanted to ship their firearms, if
27
         transport can include shipping, would be able to
28
         make sure it was unloaded, as specified in sub
29
         (a), it was rendered inoperable, and it was in a
30
         locked container. But they wouldn't be able to
31
         ensure sub (d).
32
    THE COURT: So you're saying that if the Act intended
33
         that an individual could -- intended transport to
34
         be read broadly as allowing the licence holder to,
35
         essentially, ship the firearm with somebody else,
36
         that licence holder would not be able to ensure
37
         that the regulations were complied with.
38
    MR. MYHRE: Yes, that's my submission.
39
    THE COURT: Because they wouldn't be with the firearm
40
         as it was traveling. All right; thank you.
41
    MR. MYHRE: And the second submission on the Regs, and
42
         the much more obvious one, is that s. 16
43
         contemplates shipping. Here are the circumstances
44
         in which a person can ship their firearms:
45
         if the destination is within Canada".
46
    THE COURT: Are those the only restrictions on shipping
47
         a firearm by posting it?
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MR. MYHRE: I'll just double check the table of

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contents, My Lady, but I think that was the only section actually dealing with shipping. Yes, as you can see it's -- and I -- there's not even a sub 1. So I haven't left out any subsections. THE COURT: Isn't that a bit peculiar? There's no restriction on -- there is nothing parallel to 11(a) or (b) or (c). So if you look only at s. 16, presumably the firearm could be loaded, operable, not in a locked container, not even declared as being a firearm. I find it hard to --hard to believe that there's -- there are no other restrictions on shipping by post. And if there are no other restrictions, how does that bear on your larger submission that the entire statutory scheme should be read very restrictively because of its purpose of seriously restricting the availability of firearms?

MR. MYHRE: Well, I think Your Lady has this point.

But the point is that there is a differentiation in the Reg -- in the Regs when it talks about transport versus shipping. The fact that they haven't -- the Regulations don't clamp down more on shipping -- I mean, I agree it doesn't seem particularly consistent with really trying to clamp down on firearms but there is that distinction.

THE COURT: And what is it that prevents Mr. Fox from shipping?

MR. MYHRE: It's not something he was allowed to do.

It's not something he was allowed to do by his
licence. He possessed that firearm from the time
he left his apartment until the time TNT picked it
up from the packaging depot. And there is nothing
in his licence.

THE COURT: So his licence permits only transporting?

MR. MYHRE: Transport to a port of exit.

THE COURT: All right; thank you. Mr. Fox?

SUBMISSIONS RE FIREARMS FOR ACCUSED BY PATRICK FOX:

THE ACCUSED: There is just a couple of points that I wish to make.

First of all, with respect to s. 16, the shipping by post, it is relevant that in the first line of that, they restrict the scope of it to shipping by post only. There is no mention of

Submissions re Firearms for Accused by Patrick Fox

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shipping by courier. And so I don't believe that any of those would apply so much to this situation.

Another point I want to make is, it seems -- I get the impression that the Crown is arguing that my ATT or whatever licences I have only authorize me to transport firearms, not to ship the firearms, but there is no such thing as an authorization to ship.

And one other point that I think would be certainly very relevant here is that an ATT specifies two end points, typically, the owner's home and then whatever destination they're authorized to transport the firearms to, but it must be implicit that the person is authorized also to possess the firearms in all points between those two. And so if the packaging depot is somewhere between my home and the shooting range and I was intending to go to the shooting range at that time, then I wouldn't have been in violation of the ATT -- or the restrictions of the ATT.

And finally though, I understand that these are issues that would need to be addressed or resolved for the purpose of charging the jury, but in all honesty, I don't really see how any of this has much to do with the s. 93 allegation. Because that — that charge or that allegation is that I possessed the firearms at the packaging depot, and as we saw from the cross-examination yesterday, there is actually no evidence that the firearms were ever there, and I never actually admitted that I shipped the firearms. I only stated that I sent the firearms to Los Angeles.

So beyond the purpose of charging the jury, I'm not sure that all of this discussion really has a lot of relevance to the charge.

THE COURT: All right. Just on that last point, Mr. Fox. And it -- I -- this doesn't deal with the legal issue that I've asked for submissions on, but with the trial more generally, when you say there was no evidence that the firearms were ever at the packaging depot, I feel I need to point out to you that there is circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that they were. And that is the evidence that -- from Mr. Mangat, that he came and met you at your home, outside your apartment, picked up boxes, took them back to his

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1 packaging depot, did this, did that, sent them off, ultimately, with UPS. And then we have the 3 evidence from the agent who saw the boxes at Ms. Munoz's home and found firearms in them. So --4 5 THE ACCUSED: Okay; fair enough. 6 THE COURT: -- it's some evidence that -- from which a 7 jury could reasonably conclude that they were -the firearms were the boxes at the time Mr. Mangat 8 9 picked them up from you. 10 THE ACCUSED: Okay. 11 THE COURT: So -- and also, just to be clear, the 12 reason I'm asking for submissions on this point of 13 law, how do we get to the charge in Count 2. How 14 does -- what -- what law is the Crown relying on 15 and how does it get from point A to point B? 16 That's potentially confusing. What -- what's the 17 legal basis for the charge that the Crown has laid 18 or proved in Count 2 so that I can tell the jury 19 about the elements of that charge? And I felt 20 that the Crown needed to explain in greater detail 21 what aspects of the law it's relying on and how --22 essentially, what the Crown theory is, the legal 23 theory, about why it was that you were committing 24 an offence by, if it's proven that you were, 25 sending those firearms in the way that they were 26 sent. 27 So the Crown has taken me through the aspects 28 of the Firearms Act, the regulation that the Crown 29 says supports the interpretation the Crown's 30 relying on. Yesterday, I believe it was, the 31 Crown took me through the provisions that deal 32 with how it is that you came to be licenced and 33 what your licence allows and doesn't allow. I do 34 wish to look at the key Criminal Code provisions 35 in the French version because interpreting --36 where there is any sort of ambiguity, it can be 37 useful to do that. 38 So how do you wish to deal with this, Mr. 39 Myhre? I can stand down. You can consult the 40 French provisions; I can go and look them up. 41 MR. MYHRE: I'm not sure how else to do it? 42 THE COURT: I'm sorry? Yeah; I think that's what we would have to 43 MR. MYHRE: 44 do, My Lady. 45 THE COURT: All right. Then we'll do that, and I don't 46 think that will take very long. Mr. Fox, are you

able to sort of hold on to the video connection

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1
         and we'll resume in about 10 or 15 minutes. Will
2
         that work?
3
    THE ACCUSED: Sure.
    THE CLERK: I'll just leave him dialed up. I won't
4
5
         disconnect it.
6
    THE COURT: All right. Then --
7
    THE ACCUSED: Okay.
8
    THE COURT: -- we'll do that. And Mr. Myhre, are
9
         thinking about 15 minutes should be enough?
10
    MR. MYHRE: Yes, I think I can just pull it up on my --
11
         on my cell phone.
    THE COURT: All right. So we'll stand down briefly;
12
13
         thank you.
14
15
              (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED)
16
              (PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED)
17
18
    MR. MYHRE: My Lady, I was able to look at the French
19
         versions of the Regs and the Act. I can't say I
20
         have anything else helpful to say.
21
    THE COURT: All right. I was able to look at the
22
         French version of the Act, and I found that it
23
         casts no different light on the intended meaning,
24
         and if anything, reinforces the interpretation
25
         that Crown counsel was putting forward in that it
26
         uses the word "particulier" to mean individual in
27
         a number of circumstances where the reference is
28
         to the holder of the licence.
29
              Any further submissions from either Mr. Fox
30
         or Mr. Myhre?
31
    THE ACCUSED: No, My Lady.
32
    MR. MYHRE: No, My Lady.
33
34
              [RULING RE FIREARMS ACT]
35
36
    THE COURT: Now, unless there are questions or anything
37
         that needs clarifying on that issue, I do have one
38
         other small issue to raise with -- with you. Mr.
39
         Myhre, anything before I raise that?
40
    MR. MYHRE: There are a couple of things I want to
41
         raise, My Lady, but not --
42
    THE COURT: But different.
43
    MR. MYHRE: -- to do with that issue.
44
    THE COURT: All right; Mr. Fox, any questions about
45
         what we've just been discussing?
46
    THE ACCUSED: No.
47
    THE COURT: So the one thing I wanted to raise was
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47

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1 admissions. The very first admission in the trial 2 was -- and I won't have the language exactly, but 3 going by memory, something to the effect of -- and 4 it dealt with the Crown book of documents taken 5 from the website, and it was essentially that the 6 material in that book accurately represents some 7 of the content of the website as of a given date, 8 and I can't remember the date exactly. 9 And I'm simply wondering whether there should 10 be a parallel admission dealing with some of the 11 other exhibits that were, it seems, taken from the 12 website. There was a defence book, for example. 13 And there were a couple of loose emails that were 14 filed. I don't have the exhibit numbers. Is that 15 something you've considered, Mr. Myhre? 16 MR. MYHRE: I did think about that, My Lady. It seems 17 to me that those other things were authenticated 18 to the extent necessary when they were put in 19 through questioning. I'm not sure it was really 20 formally gone through, but certainly the 21 questioning and the answers proceeded on the basis 22 that everyone agreed or appeared to agree that 23 these are accurate copies of the emails that were 24 exchanged between the parties. I don't think 25 there is really any issue there. 26 THE COURT: All right. So are you content it that way, 27 as well, Mr. Fox? 28 THE ACCUSED: Yes, I am. 29 THE COURT: All right; thank you. What did you wish to 30 raise, Mr. Myhre? 31 MR. MYHRE: Two things, My Lady. The first one is, it 32 seems to me that Mr. Fox representing himself is 33 in a slightly difficult position when it comes to 34 making his closing address, and so I wanted to ask 35 Your Ladyship to just caution him about the 36 difference between talking about the evidence, 37 making submissions about the evidence, and giving 38 evidence. And because he's in a position where he 39 is so familiar with everything that happened, it 40 may be difficult for Mr. Fox not to talk about 41 things that aren't in evidence, things that he knows or would like to say but that never made it 42 43 before the jury. And I expect he knows that, but 44 I thought I should mention it. 45 THE COURT: All right. That seems a cautious approach;

thank you. Mr. Fox, you do understand what a

closing address can include and not include; do

```
1
         you?
2
    THE ACCUSED: It's my understanding that I can only
3
         make reference to information that has been
4
         admitted as evidence and not bring up new
5
         information at that time.
6
    THE COURT: That's a good way of putting it. So you
7
         need to be very careful not to refer to, for
8
         example, emails that are not in evidence.
9
    THE ACCUSED: Right.
10
    THE COURT: But also you need to be careful not to
11
         start talking about your reasons for having done
         something unless you're doing it in a way that is
12
13
         based in the evidence. So for example, there
14
         might be an email that the Crown says should be
15
         interpreted in a certain way, and your position
16
         might be, no, that's not the reasonable
17
         interpretation, there is another reasonable
18
         interpretation. And you could certainly suggest
19
         to the jury that there is a different reasonable
20
         interpretation. What you cannot do is say to the
21
         jury, "Well let me tell you what I meant when I
22
         wrote that" because --
23
    THE ACCUSED: Right. Right.
24
    THE COURT: -- because that's not in evidence. We
25
         don't have direct evidence of what you meant. But
26
         in the same way that the Crown may be asking the
27
         jury to draw inferences from what you wrote, you
28
         can ask the jury to draw inferences from what you
29
         wrote. You simply can't tell them what you meant
30
         because that would be --
31
    THE ACCUSED: Okay.
32
    THE COURT: -- that would be giving evidence.
33
    THE ACCUSED: Right; okay.
34
    THE COURT: Are there other areas that might seem like
35
         grey areas, Mr. Myhre; that you think it would be
36
         helpful to address with Mr. Fox?
37
    MR. MYHRE: That's the only one that occurs to me, My
38
         Lady.
39
    THE COURT: Another example, you might be tempted to
40
         tell the jury why you did something. And again,
41
         that's not in evidence. And you would be
42
         improperly giving evidence through a closing if
43
         you were to say, "Well, the reason I did that
44
45
              But there may be some situations where you
46
         could suggest to the jury that the only reasonable
47
         inferences that a person would do something for a
```

```
1
         particular reason. People bound by custody
2
         orders, for example, usually have a need to
3
         communicate about how the child will go from one
         person to the other, for example.
4
    THE ACCUSED: Okay.
5
6
    THE COURT: You -- I think I'm belabouring the point.
7
         I think you understand the point.
8
    THE ACCUSED: I understand.
9
    THE COURT: All right; thank you.
10
    THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
11
    THE COURT: Mr. Myhre, was there something else?
    MR. MYHRE: One more thing, My Lady. I just wanted to
12
13
         clarify and canvass my understanding of what the
14
         law is when it comes to talking about the elements
15
         of the offence, and specifically what evidence is
16
         relevant to either repeated communication or
17
         threatening conduct. And I'm thinking
18
         specifically of the blogs that are included in
19
         Exhibit 1. So these are all things the Crown says
20
         are statements by Mr. Fox. They could constitute
21
         communication if they reach people known to Ms.
22
         Capuano. They could also constitute --
23
    THE COURT: Well, just stop there. Communication in
24
         the abstract, communication to Ms. Capuano; which
25
         one?
26
    MR. MYHRE: Communication as it's defined in the
27
         criminal harassment section. So communication,
28
         direct or indirect, with the complainant or anyone
29
         known to her.
30
    THE COURT: All right.
31
    MR. MYHRE: So if -- if it's a communication designed
32
         to go to someone known to her, or if it's -- if it
33
         contains a threat of some kind, then it would be
34
         my submission that those things are things the
35
         jury can consider when they are thinking about Mr.
36
         Fox's actions. Now those things aren't -- where
37
         they aren't relevant is they're not relevant to
38
         Ms. Capuano's fear, or the legitimacy of her fear.
39
         But they are also relevant to Mr. Fox's intent;
40
         understanding what he meant, or intended by other
41
         actions he took.
42
              And my submission is that's consistent with
43
         the Taylor case that we've looked at a few times.
44
    THE COURT: Well, let me just go back to the first
45
         statement you made. The conduct -- so when you're
46
         talking about repeated communication or
47
         threatening conduct. Let -- let's call that the
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1
         conduct. The conduct has to be conduct that
         causes the other person reasonably in all the
3
         circumstances to fear for their safety.
4
    MR. MYHRE: So in that, My Lady, I respectfully
5
         disagree because I don't think that's consistent
6
         with Taylor.
7
    THE COURT: Well, look at the language of s. 264:
8
9
              ...engage[s] in conduct referred to in
10
              subsection (2) that causes that other person
11
              reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear
12
              for their safety...
13
14
    MR. MYHRE: Hmm; it's hard to argue with that, My Lady.
15
        It is inconsistent with Taylor --
16
    THE COURT: Well --
17
    MR. MYHRE: -- but --
18
                -- that may be.
    THE COURT:
19
    MR. MYHRE: -- so -- so then, I'm not going to disagree
20
         with Your Ladyship on that. It makes perfect
21
         sense. So then, my submission is and what I will
22
         be saying to the jury is that when you're thinking
23
         about what Mr. Fox's intentions were with some of
24
         the actions that did cause Ms. Capuano to fear,
25
         you can consider the things that he said in these
                 There is no evidence Ms. Capuano actually
26
         blogs.
27
         read them or that those things caused her to fear,
28
         but they're relevant to show Mr. Fox's intent with
29
         some of his other actions. We did sort of
30
         canvass --
31
    THE COURT: Well, the way I was thinking of dealing
32
         with it is that if it's material on the blogs
33
         website that comes to her attention in some way,
34
         then it could be considered in relation to the
35
         question of whether it -- well, then it could form
36
         part of the conduct that the offence must be
37
         grounded on, and it could be considered in
38
         relation to whether it reasonably caused her to
39
         fear for her safety. But if it didn't come to her
40
         attention, then it could not be considered in
41
         relation to either of those things. But it may be
42
         relevant to Mr. Fox's state of knowledge,
43
         awareness, intent.
44
    MR. MYHRE: I agree with that, My Lady.
    THE COURT: Do you have any submissions, questions
45
46
         about that, Mr. Fox?
47
    THE ACCUSED: Not specifically about that; no. But I
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suppose I should ask, just to make sure that I'm not going to be out of line with this tomorrow.
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2
3
         In closing arguments, is there -- there won't be
4
         an issue with me bringing up my position that the
5
         website is really just a question of free speech;
6
         right? I mean, because that wasn't brought up
7
         during the trial.
8
    THE COURT: Free speech is not a defence as such.
9
    THE ACCUSED: Right.
10
    THE COURT: If the Crown were to prove all the elements
11
         of the offence of criminal harassment, then that
12
         would essentially supersede your right to freedom
13
         of speech.
14
    THE ACCUSED: Right.
15
    THE COURT: But there may be a more subtle way in which
16
         you can put the idea of freedom of speech before
17
         the jury in your closing address. I get the
18
         impression that it may be your position that you
19
         simply cannot foresee any situation in which
20
         someone, Ms. Capuano, would be troubled by
21
         publication of something that is true. I don't
22
         know if that's your position? Do you want to tell
23
         me more about what you wish to say about free
24
         speech? And then I could be a bit more --
25
    THE ACCUSED: Sure.
26
    THE COURT: -- helpful. You don't have to.
27
    THE ACCUSED: Well, it would come up tomorrow anyway,
28
         so.
29
    MR. MYHRE: Well --
    THE ACCUSED: Now I --
30
31
    MR. MYHRE: Sorry, My Lady. I just want to say it. By
32
         saying this, Mr. Fox, gives me the opportunity to
33
         respond to that in my closing address. And it --
34
         it may be that I've already thought of that and
35
         put it in there, but I don't want to be in a
36
         position where --
37
    THE COURT: I was going to point out the same thing.
38
         did yesterday. But, Mr. Fox, you -- by having
39
         chosen not to call evidence, you get a -- what's
40
         sometimes considered a strategic advantage of
41
         making your closing address last. And I do not
42
         wish to remove that advantage by having you say
43
         now in Mr. Myhre's presence what it is that you
44
         want to say to the jury tomorrow.
45
              I'm doing -- I'm -- I'm saying these things
46
         only -- or asking you these questions only because
47
         you asked me a question --
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1 THE ACCUSED: Correct. THE COURT: -- "Can you bring you up free speech?" 2 3 I -- because you don't want to say something 4 inappropriate. And I should add that if you were 5 to put before the jury something that was 6 completely inappropriate, I might need to tell 7 them that in my charge. So we have to tread very carefully here. I don't want to undermine your --8 9 the effect of your closing. I can tell you free 10 speech is not a defence to criminal harassment. 11 THE ACCUSED: I understand that free speech is probably 12 -- first let me say, I have no concerns about if 13 Mr. Myhre hears this at this point. I know that 14 other things that I have said, he has brought them 15 up; for example, on the direct examination of Ms. 16 Capuano. So I would expect that he would bring it 17 up ahead of time. I have no issue with that. 18 Now, I know that free speech would not be a 19 defence for harassments with respect to direct or 20 indirect communication. However, I'm still of the 21 position that a publicly accessible website must 22 be viewed as a public forum. And that's where I 23 expect to bring up the point of free speech. 24 Myhre's position is that the website somehow 25 constitutes harassment. My position is Ms. Capuano doesn't have to go to the website if she 26 27 doesn't want to be subjected to it. 28 And if we say that the website, or the 29 contents on the website is somehow harassment and 30 should not occur, it seems that we're really 31 putting a large chilling effect on everybody's 32 pursuit or -- or their exercise of free speech. 33 mean, I would be a little afraid that a case like 34 this then could result in a lot of angry 35 ex-husbands or single fathers afraid then to voice 36 any opinion of their ex-wives. And that's the 37 type of issue that I would be looking to bring up 38 on closing. Not so much -- not at all with 39 respect to the emails. That's unquestionably not 40 protected by free speech. But rather the publicly 41 made statements that were intended to be received 42 by the general public, not at all by Ms. Capuano. 43 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Myhre, what's your 44 submission on whether that is a -- whether there 45 is anything problematic about Mr. Fox putting that 46 theory of the defence to the jury? Essentially, 47 that Ms. Capuano didn't have to look at the blog

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1 or the website. MR. MYHRE: It seems to me that he's really treading 2 3 into the area of the law there, and there needs to 4 be - I think we already canvassed this - a pretty 5 clear instruction on the circumstances of this 6 case and what constitutes repeated communication, 7 direct or indirect, with Ms. Capuano or any person known to her. So the jury has to have an 8 9 instruction on what does that mean when Mr. Fox is 10 sending her emails telling her about the website 11 and what's going on with the website. 12 And my submission is that when that happens, 13 it ceases to be -- I mean, then it's quite clearly 14 direct communication. 15 THE COURT: I think what you're saying is that the 16 emails incorporate the effect of the website into 17 the emails as direct communication. MR. MYHRE: Yes. And in addition, you could also view 18 19 some of what Mr. Fox says to Ms. Capuano about the 20 website as threatening conduct because he ties the 21 website into her not being able to get a job, 22 which in my submission to the jury will be that's 23 very obviously what one of his purposes was with 24 the website. 25 THE COURT: All right; thank you. Mr. Fox, you have my 26 answer that free speech is not a defence to 27 criminal harassment. You have Mr. Myhre's 28 response which is, essentially, an argument about 29 how the evidence should be characterized. I'm not 30 sure I can say much more to you without more 31 specifics about exactly what it is you may be 32 saying to the jury. 33 THE ACCUSED: Sure; okay. THE COURT: Does that answer your question or does it 34 35 not answer your question? 36 THE ACCUSED: Well, yeah, that does -- that does answer 37 my question. I mean, it does raise some concerns 38 on my end that probably wouldn't really be 39 appropriate to get into at this point anyway. 40 One thing I am becoming increasingly 41 concerned about is the point that I made yesterday 42 that Ms. Capuano lives in a jurisdiction that has 43 one set of laws. I live in another. And I can 44 see the ruling in this case, if it goes a certain 45 way, or the -- the outcome of this case, causing a 46 lot of complication or concerns about those types

of issues that Ms. Capuano is not subject to any

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1
         concept of psychological harm or psychological
2
         safety, so she could do whatever she wants about
3
         me. I was speaking with Ms. Clancy [phonetic]
4
         this morning, for example. Ms. Capuano continues
5
         to make all these claims and allegations against
6
         me, but then I find myself in a position where I'm
7
         not even able to respond to those or to defend
8
         against those allegations without fear of being
9
         subjected to criminal harassment prosecution,
10
         which is, to a large extent, what I'm having with
11
         this case. Ms. Capuano went on the news and made
12
         these allegations, so I wrote a blog post
13
         responding to that. All of sudden I find myself
14
         being accused of -- of threatening her and now
15
         being charged with criminal harassment.
16
              But as I said, that's probably something that
17
         wouldn't be appropriate to discuss at this point.
18
    THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Myhre, that
19
         you'd like to raise? Mr. Fox?
20
    THE ACCUSED: No.
21
    MR. MYHRE: No, My Lady. Will we -- you did mention
22
         the possibility of giving us the draft of the
23
         charge tomorrow morning before we do our closings?
24
    THE COURT: I did.
25
    MR. MYHRE: Is that possible?
26
    THE COURT: I'll have to see. I expect so.
27
    MR. MYHRE: Would it be possible then to convene
28
         briefly at 9:30 or perhaps to come to the registry
29
         at 9:30 or...?
30
    THE COURT: I have another matter at 9:00. I was going
31
         to suggest a quarter to 9:00, but Mr. Fox won't be
32
         here at quarter to 9:00. I think --
33
    MR. MYHRE: Well, My Lady, I could get the charge from
         you and give a copy to Mr. Fox.
34
35
    THE COURT: Well, then what I suggest is that -- Madam
36
         Registrar, do you know what courtroom I'll be in
37
         for the nine o'clock matter? Will it be --
38
    THE CLERK: No, I tried to message, My Lady, but --
39
    THE COURT: Ah --
40
    THE CLERK: -- no one is -- I think they're doing the
41
         list right now.
42
    MR. MYHRE: We can -- I can find it.
43
    THE COURT: All right. I'll certainly have something.
44
         There may be some blanks in it, but I'll certainly
45
         have something you can have. And what I suggest
46
         is that you show up at the courtroom somewhere
47
         around 9:00 to 9:15. I don't know how long this
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1
         other matter will take. And in any event, I might
         just briefly interrupt it, give you the copies, or
2
3
         perhaps ask Madam Registrar to give you the copies
4
         on your undertaking, Mr. Myhre, that you'll
5
         immediately deliver one to Mr. Fox so that he's
         not disadvantaged by having one later than you, so
7
         that you're effectively going to receive them at
8
         the same time, Mr. Myhre.
9
    MR. MYHRE: Very good, My Lady. Mr. Fox, what time do
         you usually get here in the morning?
10
11
    THE ACCUSED: 9:30.
12
    THE COURT: Ah. All right; nothing else?
13
    THE ACCUSED: No.
14
    THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much and we'll
15
         adjourn until tomorrow morning.
    THE CLERK: Order in court. This court stands
16
17
         adjourned until tomorrow morning at ten o'clock
18
         a.m.
19
20
              (VIDEOCONFERENCE CONCLUDES)
21
22
              (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO JUNE 21, 2017, AT
23
              10:00 A.M.)
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    Transcriber: J. Vanin
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 I hereby certify the foregoing to be a true and accurate transcript of the evidence recorded on a sound recording apparatus, transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

J. Vanin

Court Transcriber